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Petra D. Fist [ARGUED] 
P & D Solutions 
1209 Kirkwood Highway 
2 
 
Wilmington, DE 19805 
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Christin M. Whitacre [ARGUED] 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044 
 Counsel for Respondent 
 
________________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Immigration law is a field in which fair, accurate fact-
finding is of critical importance.  The need in immigration 
proceedings for effective attorneys who can competently 
marshal the evidence on each side is therefore of 
commensurate importance.  Yet aliens—often poor, often non-
English speaking—are disproportionately saddled with low-
quality counsel, and the consequences can be drastic.  This is a 
case in point.  Petitioner Sergio Calderon-Rosas paid a now-
disbarred attorney to represent him in removal proceedings, 
and Calderon-Rosas was ordered deported after that attorney 
failed to present key evidence supporting his application for 
cancellation of removal.  Calderon-Rosas sought a new 
hearing, arguing that he was deprived of due process by, among 
other things, his attorney’s ineffective assistance, but the Board 
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of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied his claims.  We must 
decide whether we have jurisdiction to review due process 
claims where a petitioner, like Calderon-Rosas, seeks only 
discretionary relief—and if so, whether Calderon-Rosas’s 
claims have merit.  Because we conclude that we have 
jurisdiction and Calderon-Rosas plainly presents a meritorious 
ineffective-assistance claim, we will vacate the Board’s 
decision and remand. 
 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1 
 
Calderon-Rosas, a Mexican national, initially entered 
the United States in 2001.  He has lived in the United States 
since 2001.  Though he and his wife lack lawful immigration 
status, their three children are U.S. citizens.  Before he was 
detained, Calderon-Rosas had been a reliable and well-liked 
contractor in the Norristown, Pennsylvania, area for eleven 
years.  His neighbors consider him “pleasant and sociable” and 
his children “well dressed and polite.”  JA 379.  At least until 
their father’s detention by immigration authorities, the children 
were successful students at the local public schools, and the 
whole family was baptized in the Saint Patrick Church of 
Norristown, Pennsylvania, whose pastor considers them 
“hardworking, honest and compassionate.”  JA 370. 
 
Yet in 2018, Calderon-Rosas was charged with a DUI—
and while those charges were later dismissed, the Government 
nonetheless initiated removal proceedings.  Desirous of 
remaining in this country, Calderon-Rosas hired attorney 
 
1 The facts here are drawn from the transcript of the 
removal hearing, the agency’s decisions, and evidentiary 
attachments to Calderon-Rosas’s administrative filings.   
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Douglas Grannan to represent him, and Grannan represented 
Calderon-Rosas at his removal hearing before an Immigration 
Judge (IJ).  Grannan, however, was ill suited to the task:  He 
would soon be disbarred for “multiple violations of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct in seven separate client matters” 
amounting to a “troubling pattern of neglect.”  Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Grannan, No. 197 DB 2016, slip op. 
at 83 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd. Apr. 3, 2019), report and 
recommendation adopted per curiam, No. 2597 Disciplinary 
Docket No. 3 (Pa. July 9, 2019) (suspending Grannan); Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel v. Grannan, No. 177 DB 2019, slip op. 
at 1 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd. Oct. 18, 2019), report and 
recommendation adopted per curiam, No. 2660 Disciplinary 
Docket No. 3 (Pa. Oct. 18, 2019) (disbarring Grannan).  The 
hallmarks of Grannan’s “pattern of neglect” were a lack of 
client communication, a failure to submit appropriate 
documents, and a wanton disregard for his client’s prospects of 
obtaining relief.  See, e.g., id. at 83, 85–93. 
 
Grannan’s representation of Calderon-Rosas was as 
poor as his record would predict.  Calderon-Rosas sought to 
present claims for asylum, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158, and 
cancellation of removal, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).  Yet, 
although Calderon-Rosas spent over $7000 on Grannan’s 
services, Grannan never visited him in detention, never 
discussed his case with him over the phone, and never helped 
Calderon-Rosas understand the requirements for obtaining the 
relief he sought.  Worse, Grannan failed to meaningfully 
pursue Calderon-Rosas’s asylum application despite telling 
Calderon-Rosas that he would do so.  And most troubling of 
all, Grannan did not obtain adequate medical records of 
Calderon-Rosas’s children to support Calderon-Rosas’s 
cancellation of removal application.   
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Not surprisingly, given the record before him, the IJ 
denied relief on all claims.  As for asylum, the IJ deemed 
Calderon-Rosas’s application abandoned, so the hearing 
proceeded only on Calderon-Rosas’s cancellation of removal 
application.  As for cancellation of removal, the IJ announced 
at the outset of the hearing that he would focus on the eligibility 
requirement that the petitioner demonstrate that a U.S. citizen 
family member—in this case, Calderon-Rosas’s children—
would suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” 8 
U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), if he were removed.  In this respect, 
Grannan argued that Calderon-Rosas’s oldest son had asthma, 
but as the IJ readily noted, the documentation Grannan had 
filed reflected that condition had been long under control such 
that “overall [the children’s] health” appeared “good.”  JA 21.  
So while the IJ found that there “may even be extreme 
hardships” to Calderon-Rosas’s children if he were deported—
among them a loss of childcare and a loss of family savings—
he found that their suffering would not meet the high threshold 
of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to qualify 
Calderon-Rosas for cancellation.  JA 21.  Based on the 
information then available to him, the IJ also held in the 
alternative that he would have declined Calderon-Rosas’s 
cancellation application as a matter of discretion.   
 
After Calderon-Rosas’s claims were denied, he 
obtained new counsel and filed with the BIA both a motion to 
remand to the IJ based on his original attorney’s ineffective 
assistance before the IJ, and an appeal based on procedural due 
process violations alleged to have occurred during the IJ 
hearing.  In support of the motion to remand and as required by 
regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2, Calderon-Rosas submitted new 
evidence, including medical records for his three children, 
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which demonstrated that his older son suffered from PTSD and 
a persistent and chronic adjustment disorder with symptoms of 
depressed mood and anxiety; his daughter also suffered from 
depression; and his younger son had “special needs” due to a 
speech delay. 
   
The BIA denied the motion to remand and dismissed 
Calderon-Rosas’s appeal.  As to the motion to remand, the BIA 
explained only that it “conclude[d] that [Calderon-Rosas] ha[d] 
not established that he was prejudiced by his prior counsel [sic] 
alleged ineffectiveness” because he “ha[d] not established 
what additional corroboration he would have submitted that 
would have impacted the outcome of the case.”  JA 8–9.  At 
the same time that it faulted him for failing to offer new 
evidence of corroboration, however, the BIA stated that “[t]o 
the extent that [Calderon-Rosas] seeks to submit new evidence 
on appeal in the form of evidence regarding his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim . . . we are without authority to 
consider new evidence offered for the first time on appeal.”  JA 
9.  The BIA also found Calderon-Rosas’s appeal of the IJ’s 
decision on procedural due process grounds meritless.   
 
 Calderon-Rosas timely petitioned for our review of 
both the BIA’s denial of his motion to remand and its dismissal 
of his appeal.  He contends that the BIA abused its discretion 
in denying his motion to remand on grounds of ineffective 
assistance of counsel and that it erred in dismissing his 
procedural due process claims. 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The BIA had jurisdiction over the motion to remand 
under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), and we have jurisdiction to review 
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its denial under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  We review the denial of a 
motion to remand for abuse of discretion, but “questions of 
law, such as whether the BIA applied the correct legal standard 
in considering the motion to [remand] and the underlying claim 
of denial of due process, are . . . reviewed de novo.”  Fadiga v. 
Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 153–54 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 
The BIA had jurisdiction over the appeal of the IJ’s 
decision under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3), and we have 
jurisdiction to review its dismissal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  
We review its legal rulings de novo and its factual findings for 
substantial evidence.  Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 379 
(3d Cir. 2010).  
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
Calderon-Rosas contends that he was denied due 
process because he received ineffective assistance of counsel 
in proceedings before the IJ and because the IJ disregarded 
various procedural regulations.  The Government opposes 
Calderon-Rosas’s claims on the merits, but also, as a threshold 
matter, challenges our jurisdiction, arguing that petitioners 
seeking discretionary relief cannot assert procedural rights 
under the Due Process Clause in this Court because they lack 
a protected liberty or property interest in such relief.  Below, 
we first ascertain our jurisdiction2 before addressing Calderon-
Rosas’s ineffective-assistance and procedural due process 
claims.     
 
2 We “always ha[ve] jurisdiction to determine [our] 
jurisdiction.”  Orie v. Dist. Att’y Allegheny Cty., 946 F.3d 187, 
190 n.7 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. 
v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
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A. Jurisdiction 
 
Before we address the merits of Calderon-Rosas’s 
claims, we must address a threshold question:  Do we have 
jurisdiction over ineffective assistance of counsel or procedural 
due process claims—both of which flow from the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause in the immigration context, 
Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 155—made by a petitioner seeking 
discretionary relief?  The question arises because, in this 
context, “[o]ur jurisdiction . . . is narrowly circumscribed in 
that it is limited to colorable [constitutional] claims or 
questions of law,” Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 186 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), (D), and 
the Government asserts that petitioners cannot state any 
cognizable constitutional claim under the Due Process Clause 
because they lack a protected interest in discretionary relief.   
 
The government’s argument, however, is one we have 
squarely rejected.  We long ago recognized that due process 
claims can be asserted by petitioners seeking discretionary 
relief because “Congress instructed the Attorney General to 
establish an asylum procedure,” and “[w]hen Congress directs 
an agency to establish a procedure . . . it can be assumed that 
Congress intends that procedure to be a fair one.”  Marincas v. 
Lewis, 92 F.3d 195, 203 (3d Cir. 1996) (addressing asylum 
claim).  “[F]airness,” we explained, “mandate[s] that the 
asylum procedure promulgated by the Attorney General 
provide the most basic of due process.”  Id.; see also Cham v. 
Att’y Gen., 445 F.3d 683, 691 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[A]lthough 
Cham has no constitutional right to asylum, he was entitled, as 
a matter of due process, to a full and fair hearing on his 
application.”); Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369, 373–74 
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(3d Cir. 2003) (“Ponce–Leiva’s brief . . . suggests that 
counsel’s ineffectiveness was a denial of due process. 
Accordingly, we may analyze the claim, at least within the 
parameters of due process.”). 
 
More recently, in Serrano-Alberto v. Attorney General, 
859 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2017), in exercising jurisdiction over 
claims for discretionary relief, we reiterated that “petitioners 
must receive a full and fair hearing that allows them a 
reasonable opportunity to present evidence on their behalf, and 
a decision on the merits of their claim by a neutral and impartial 
arbiter.”  Id. at 213 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  That procedural due process right, we explained, is 
comprised of “three key protections” in immigration 
proceedings: “(1) ‘factfinding based on a record produced 
before the decisionmaker and disclosed to him or her’; (2) the 
opportunity to ‘make arguments on his or her own behalf’; and 
(3) ‘an individualized determination of his [or her] interests.’”  
Id.  (quoting Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 239 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(en banc)).  In short, “[t]hroughout all phases of deportation 
proceedings, petitioners must be afforded due process of law.”  
Id.    
 
As our case law likewise establishes, ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims are no less cognizable by 
petitioners seeking discretionary relief.  It is by now beyond 
question that the Due Process Clause guarantees aliens the 
right to effective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings.  
Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 155; Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 
637, 638 (BIA 1988).  And as with procedural due process 
claims, we have never before discriminated among ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims based on whether the petitioners 
raising them sought discretionary or mandatory relief.  See, 
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e.g., Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 250, 256 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(granting ineffective-assistance claim and remanding to the 
BIA for consideration of petitioner’s claims for relief).  That is 
because, as the Second Circuit has explained, “[r]uling on an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim does not require us to 
substitute our discretion for that of the agency; it is simply a 
determination that the alien was not given a fair hearing 
because of counsel’s errors.”  Omar v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 647, 
650 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 
 
Our recognition of due process claims by petitioners 
seeking discretionary relief is consistent with bedrock 
principles of Supreme Court case law.  The Supreme Court has 
explained that “the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due 
process of law in deportation proceedings,” Reno v. Flores, 
507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993), because “the Due Process Clause 
applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including 
aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, 
temporary, or permanent,” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 
693 (2001).  Thus, “aliens who have once passed through our 
gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings 
conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in 
due process of law.”  Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. 
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953); see also Wong Yang Sung v. 
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950) (“When the Constitution 
requires a hearing, it requires a fair one, one before a tribunal 
which meets at least currently prevailing standards of 
impartiality.”).  Our longstanding recognition of the right to a 
fundamentally fair hearing, Serrano-Alberto, 859 F.3d at 213, 
simply echoes these propositions. 
 
Surprisingly, however, our sister Circuits range the 
gamut on whether this right extends to petitioners seeking 
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discretionary relief.3  And relying on some of those out-of-
Circuit opinions, see, e.g., Rivera v. Sessions, 903 F.3d 147, 
 
3 The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits either decline 
jurisdiction over procedural due process and ineffective-
assistance claims for discretionary relief, or have decided that 
such claims are not cognizable in connection with 
discretionary relief proceedings.  Pinos-Gonzalez v. Mukasey, 
519 F.3d 436, 441 (8th Cir. 2008) (procedural due process); 
Scheerer v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir. 
2008); Nativi-Gomez v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 805, 808–09 (8th 
Cir. 2003) (ineffective assistance); Mejia Rodriguez v. Reno, 
178 F.3d 1139, 1148 (11th Cir. 1999) (ineffective assistance).  
The First and Fifth Circuits exercise jurisdiction over 
ineffective-assistance claims, but have taken the same 
approach as the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits on procedural 
due process claims.  Mejia v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 482, 490 (5th 
Cir. 2019) (due process); Diaz v. Sessions, 894 F.3d 222, 226–
27 (5th Cir. 2018) (ineffective assistance); Rivera v. Sessions, 
903 F.3d 147, 151 (1st Cir. 2018) (due process); Hernandez v. 
Reno, 238 F.3d 50, 55–56 (1st Cir. 2001) (ineffective 
assistance).  The Tenth Circuit exercises limited jurisdiction 
over procedural due process claims, Salgado-Toribio v. 
Holder, 713 F.3d 1267, 1271 (10th Cir. 2013), and has not 
addressed ineffective-assistance claims.  The Second Circuit 
exercises jurisdiction over ineffective-assistance claims, Omar 
v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 647, 650 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), and 
has not addressed procedural due process claims.  The Seventh 
Circuit exercises jurisdiction over procedural due process 
claims and the performance prong of ineffective-assistance 
claims.  Zambrano-Reyes v. Holder, 725 F.3d 744, 750–51 (7th 
Cir. 2013) (ineffective assistance); Delgado v. Holder, 674 
F.3d 759, 766 (7th Cir. 2012) (due process).  The Ninth Circuit 
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151 (1st Cir. 2018), the Government argues that we lack 
jurisdiction to review any procedural due process or ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims made by aliens seeking 
discretionary relief.  The crux of its theory is that a “claim of 
deprivation of due process requires that a cognizable liberty or 
property interest be at stake,” and “discretionary forms of relief 
do not rise to the level of such a protected interest.”  Rivera, 
903 F.3d at 150–51 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  The only cognizable liberty interest the Government 
would recognize is in the specific procedures provided by 
Congress, regardless of whether those procedures are 
administered fairly and impartially.   
 
For the reasons previously stated, this argument is 
foreclosed by our case law.  See Marincas, 92 F.3d at 203; 
Serrano-Alberto, 859 F.3d at 213.  But more fundamentally, it 
conflates the existence of a statutory entitlement with the 
fairness of the process by which a petitioner may be deprived 
of it.  As an initial matter, a “liberty interest may arise from . . . 
an expectation or interest created by state laws or policies,” 
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005), and “a person’s 
liberty is equally protected, even when the liberty itself is a 
statutory creation of the State,” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 
539, 558 (1974); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 226 (1976).  
But it is equally true that “[w]hen Congress directs an agency 
to establish a procedure . . . it can be assumed that Congress 
 
exercises jurisdiction over both procedural due process and 
ineffective-assistance claims.  Fernandez v. Gonzales, 439 
F.3d 592, 602–03 (9th Cir. 2006) (ineffective assistance); 
Antonio-Cruz v. INS, 147 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 1998) (due 
process). 
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intends that procedure to be a fair one.”  Marincas, 92 F.3d at 
203.4   
 
The Government’s position, moreover, would lead to 
absurd results:  At oral argument, for example,  the 
Government went so far as to posit that, so long as an alien 
seeking only discretionary relief had the opportunity to 
reasonably present evidence, he would have no cognizable due 
process claim—and hence, no recourse to the federal courts—
even if the IJ denied that relief “based on the flip of a coin.”  
Tr. 43.  We think that conception of due process is not only 
inconsistent with our case law but would be anathema to our 
Founding Fathers.  See Chehazeh v. Att’y Gen., 666 F.3d 118, 
130 (3d Cir. 2012) (stating that “substantive liberty rights and 
. . . due process rights” are both “areas that courts often are 
called upon to protect”). 
 
In sum, petitioners seeking discretionary relief are 
entitled to fundamentally fair removal proceedings, which 
constitutes a protected interest supporting a due process claim.  
Because Calderon-Rosas’s due process claims are also 
colorable on their merits, as discussed below, our review of 
those claims is a proper exercise of jurisdiction. 
 
 
4 Ironically, even adopting the Government’s 
constrained view of the process that is due to petitioners 
seeking discretionary relief, the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim asserted here would be cognizable.  That is 
because Congress has also provided a statutory right to 
counsel, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.3, 
and to present evidence, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B). 
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B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
After the IJ denied relief, Calderon-Rosas moved to 
remand his proceedings on grounds of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  The BIA denied the motion, and he appealed.5  He 
contends that Grannan’s representation prevented him from 
obtaining a fundamentally fair hearing on both his cancellation 
of removal and asylum claims.  We discuss each contention in 
turn. 
 
1. Cancellation of Removal 
 
Calderon-Rosas’s motion to remand alleged that 
Grannan’s failure to adduce sufficient evidence of his 
children’s health conditions deprived him of a fundamentally 
fair hearing on his cancellation of removal claim.  The BIA 
denied the motion.  That decision was an abuse of discretion in 
two respects:  It misapplied the legal standard and it was wrong 
on the merits. 
 
First, the BIA misapplied the standard for assessing 
whether Calderon-Rosas had demonstrated he was prejudiced 
by Grannan’s performance.  The BIA held that Calderon-Rosas 
had not demonstrated that Grannan’s performance “impacted 
the outcome of the [removal proceeding].”  JA 9.  But the 
familiar standard for prejudice in an ineffective-assistance 
claim is whether there is a “reasonable probability” that “the IJ 
would not have entered an order of removal absent counsel’s 
errors.”  Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 159.  That does not require a 
 
5 Our jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 embraces 
review of denials of motions to reopen.  Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 
F.3d 556, 560–61 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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petitioner to show counsel’s deficient performance did, in fact, 
affect the outcome of the case, or even that a different outcome 
was “more likely than not”; instead, we have cautioned, 
“reasonable probability” means merely a “significant 
possibility.”  United States v. Payano, 930 F.3d 186, 193 n.5 
(3d Cir. 2019).  We have also admonished that in applying this 
standard, while the BIA need not “write an exegesis on every 
contention,” it must “consider the issues raised, and announce 
its decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to 
perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted.”  
Filja, 447 F.3d at 256 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).   
 
Here, the BIA failed to do so, and its application of the 
“reasonable probability” standard was erroneous.  The entirety 
of its explanation for denying Calderon-Rosas’s motion to 
remand was as follows:  “[T]he respondent has not established 
what additional corroboration he would have submitted that 
would have impacted the outcome of the case.  Moreover, we 
note that the Immigration Judge did not deny the respondent’s 
application for cancellation of removal on the basis of a lack of 
corroboration.”  JA 9.  As in Filja, “there is nothing in [this] 
one paragraph devoted to the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim that is suggestive of [a sufficient] review or that [the 
BIA] grasped [Calderon-Rosas’s] serious allegations 
supporting his ineffective assistance claim.”  447 F.3d at 256.  
Indeed, the BIA entirely failed to discuss the significance of 
the hundred-plus pages of new evidence Calderon-Rosas 
submitted.  Instead, paradoxically, it simultaneously faulted 
Calderon-Rosas for “not establish[ing] what additional 
corroboration he would have submitted,” JA 9, despite clear 
briefing and evidence to the contrary, and pronounced that it 
was “without authority to consider new evidence offered for 
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the first time on appeal,” id., despite clearly applicable law to 
the contrary, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (requiring submission of 
new evidence to support motion to remand).  To the extent the 
BIA did take account of the new evidence that it both failed to 
identify and incorrectly claimed it could not consider, it also 
misapprehended its significance:  Calderon-Rosas did not seek 
to “corroborat[e]” the evidence he had submitted at the IJ 
hearing, JA 9; instead, he sought to introduce wholly new 
evidence of his children’s health conditions.  In short, the 
BIA’s woefully inadequate reasoning fell well short of 
demonstrating that it “reviewed the record and grasped the 
movant’s claims.”  Filja, 447 F.3d at 256. 
 
If the BIA had applied the correct legal standard to the 
evidence set forth by Calderon-Rosas, it would have 
concluded, as we do, that his motion to remand should have 
been granted.6  An alien seeking to reopen his immigration 
proceedings based on ineffective assistance of counsel must 
demonstrate that “competent counsel would have acted 
otherwise” and that he was “prejudiced by counsel’s poor 
performance.”7  Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 157 (citations omitted).  
 
6 We have no need to remand for the BIA to reconsider 
its erroneous ruling.  As in Fadiga, “it would be an act of 
supererogation for this [C]ourt to ask the BIA to determine 
whether [Grannan’s] representation fell below minimal 
professional standards, thereby prejudicing [Calderon-
Rosas],” because the “full record of [Grannan’s] representation 
is before us, and we are competent to assess what transpired.”  
Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 162.   
 
7 He must also meet certain procedural requirements set 
forth by the BIA for ineffective-assistance claims, see Lozada, 
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Of Grannan’s incompetence there can be no doubt.  We have 
held that an attorney’s failure to produce easily available 
evidence supporting a claim for immigration relief falls below 
the constitutionally required standard of performance.  See 
Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 162.  Such a failure to produce evidence 
was precisely Grannan’s error in the present case:  He failed to 
adduce medical records that would have been easily obtainable 
with proper notice to Calderon-Rosas’s family and that would 
have supported Calderon-Rosas’s application for cancellation 
of removal.  Indeed, the Government does not even argue that 
Grannan’s performance met the constitutional minimum.   
 
Rather, the disputed question is whether Calderon-
Rosas was prejudiced by Grannan’s errors.  Again, the answer 
without question is yes.  As we have explained, Calderon-
Rosas must show only a “reasonable probability” that his 
cancellation of removal claim would have been granted had 
Grannan submitted evidence of his children’s medical 
hardships.  Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 159.  In determining whether 
Calderon-Rosas was eligible for cancellation of removal, the IJ 
expressly announced that he would focus his attention on the 
question of whether “exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship” would result for Calderon-Rosas’s U.S. citizen 
children if he were removed.  JA 253.  And the seminal case 
construing that standard explains that a “strong” case of such 
hardship is presented by an alien with “a qualifying child with 
very serious health issues.”  In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & 
N. Dec. 56, 63 (BIA 2001).  Yet the only medical evidence 
Grannan submitted related to a mild asthmatic condition in 
Calderon-Rosas’s older son that was “under control,” which 
 
19 I. & N. Dec. at 639, but the Government does not dispute 
that Calderon-Rosas satisfied those requirements here. 
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led the IJ to conclude that the children’s health was generally 
“good,” JA 21.  Grannan failed to adduce evidence that 
Calderon-Rosas’s older son suffered from PTSD and a 
persistent and chronic adjustment disorder with symptoms of 
depressed mood and anxiety; that his daughter also suffered 
from depression; and that his younger son suffered from a 
speech delay. 
   
Constitutionally adequate counsel would have 
introduced this evidence and, given the relevant precedent and 
the IJ’s focus on hardship to Calderon-Rosas’s children and on 
their “good” health, there is a reasonable probability the IJ 
would have granted cancellation.  Calderon-Rosas is therefore 
entitled to a new hearing on his cancellation application.8 
 
2. Asylum 
 
Calderon-Rosas also contends that Grannan’s 
ineffective assistance entitles him to a new hearing on his 
asylum claim.  In support of this contention, he points to 
Grannan’s failure to file a facially adequate asylum application 
and the IJ’s consequent ruling that the application was 
abandoned.  While surely deficient performance on Grannan’s 
 
8 Though the IJ also held in the alternative that he would 
have denied Calderon-Rosas’s application as a matter of 
discretion, his attention to Calderon-Rosas’s children’s 
hardship, particularly with respect to their health, suggests a 
reasonable probability that he would not have reached the same 
conclusion had the medical evidence been introduced.  Thus, 
even if the Government had asked us to affirm on this basis, 
which it did not, we could not do so.   
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part, we are not persuaded that counsel’s error prejudiced 
Calderon-Rosas. 
 
A successful asylum applicant must demonstrate that he 
has a “well-founded fear of future persecution . . . motivated 
by a statutorily protected ground, namely the alien’s race, 
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a 
particular social group.”  Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 
380 (3d Cir. 2010).  Here, however, evidence in the record does 
not suggest that Calderon-Rosas can make that showing.  
Indeed, Calderon-Rosas has not seriously attempted to 
substantiate his asylum claim, relying instead on the 
unsupported proposition that the prejudice requirement in 
ineffective-assistance cases can be waived in particularly 
egregious circumstances.   
   
The closest support we can find for this proposition is a 
Ninth Circuit rule that an attorney’s “failure to file a necessary 
document creates a presumption of prejudice” which is 
rebutted where “the petitioner lacks plausible grounds for 
relief.”  Hernandez-Mendoza v. Gonzales, 537 F.3d 976, 979 
(9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
We have not adopted that presumption, and we need not do so 
today:  Even if it did apply, it would be rebutted here; the 
entirety of Calderon-Rosas’s asylum evidence consists of an 
affidavit from his wife stating that she was sexually assaulted 
in Mexico many years ago and fears returning.  That 
circumstance, while no doubt traumatic, pertains to Calderon-
Rosas’s wife’s fear of persecution, not his own, and does not 
establish membership in a cognizable “particular social 
group.”  Calderon-Rosas therefore is not entitled to a new 
asylum hearing due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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C. Procedural Due Process 
 
Calderon-Rosas also alleges that six other due process 
violations occurred at his IJ hearing.  Four of these claims, 
however, were not exhausted to the BIA as required for us to 
review them.  Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 448 (3d 
Cir. 2005). 
 
That leaves two exhausted procedural due process 
claims: the admission of Calderon-Rosas’s inaccurate tax 
returns as evidence and the lack of an interpreter in the first 
part of his hearing.  Neither, however, rendered the 
proceedings fundamentally unfair.  See Serrano-Alberto, 859 
F.3d at 213.  Even granting Calderon-Rosas’s contention that 
Grannan’s poor planning and communication led him to hastily 
prepare and submit mistake-ridden tax returns into evidence, 
no prejudice resulted because the IJ did not consider them a 
negative factor.  And while the IJ should have involved an 
interpreter from the outset of the hearing, this error did not 
render the proceedings fundamentally unfair.  Indeed, at oral 
argument, Calderon-Rosas’s counsel was unable to identify 
any portion of the hearing transcript that suggested Calderon-
Rosas was prejudiced by the interpreter’s initial absence.  In 
the absence of prejudice, Calderon-Rosas was not deprived of 
due process by the alleged errors.9 
 
9 We do not find the presumption of prejudice 
articulated in Leslie v. Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 171, 178 (3d Cir. 
2010) applicable to either of Calderon-Rosas’s due process 
arguments as presented.  Because, as Calderon-Rosas 
acknowledges, an interpreter was present for all but the 
introductory portion of the IJ hearing in this case, we need not 
decide whether the absence of an interpreter for the entirety or 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the BIA’s 
denial of Calderon-Rosas’s motion to remand and remand for 
a new hearing on his application for cancellation of removal, 
and we will affirm the BIA’s dismissal of Calderon-Rosas’s 
asylum claim.   
 
even the substantive portion of a petitioner’s hearing would 
trigger Leslie’s presumption. 
